For decades, Texas Democrats relied on the counties along the border as the vouchsafe foundation of a potential statewide coalition. El Paso, Webb, Hidalgo, Cameron, and the vast stretches of the Rio Grande Valley provided margins sizable enough to offset some of the Republican dominance in Central Texas, the Panhandle, plus the suburbs of Dallas and Houston (this was all before the partisan realignment shifts in the suburbs, of course). The working theory held that so long as Texas Democrats could run up the score along the border, they had a path to statewide competitiveness.
However, recent elections suggest that this firewall may be eroding. A closer examination of 753 border precincts reaching from El Paso to Brownsville illustrate a consistent Democratic decline. The region still tilts blue, but the margins are shrinking, and in some places, the partisan safety net is collapsing.
In 2022, Beto O’Rourke carried the border precincts in his gubernatorial race against Governor Greg Abbott with nearly a twenty-point margin. Two years later, Colin Allred won them in his Senate race against Ted Cruz, but only by ten points. In that same year, Vice President Kamala Harris carried these precincts against Donald Trump by a mere 1.6 points. What had been a stalwart Democratic bastion became a near tie within the span of a election cycle, especially at top-of-ticket.
Midterm Turnout Dynamics
A variable component that helps explain part of the story is simply voter turnout. In 2022, these 753 border precincts generated around 466,000 voters participated. By 2024, however, more than 709,000 ballots were cast. That represents a surge of more than 50 percent. The increase was not the result of new organic Democratic expansion, though. It reflects the structural difference between a midterm election in 2022 and a presidential election in 2024, when voter participation traditionally spikes.
One potential troubling anecdote for Democrats in Texas is that Republicans capitalized on this expanded electorate more effectively. Instead of being overwhelmed by the higher base turnout that normally benefits Democrats, Republicans consolidated both their base and expanded their electoral presence. Abbott’s forty percent share in 2022 gave way to Cruz’s forty-five percent in 2024, and Trump pushed that even further, coming within 1.6 points of overtaking Harris. In other words, once the wellspring of Democratic margins, the border looked more like contested territory in the 2024 cycle.
O’Rourke vs. Abbott (2022 General)
The first map shows the 2022 gubernatorial contest between Beto O’Rourke and Greg Abbott. Across the 753 border precincts, O’Rourke prevailed with nearly 60 percent of the vote, beating Abbott by close to twenty points. His margins rested on traditional Democratic stronghold counties like El Paso, Webb, Hidalgo, and Cameron, which still delivered decisive advantages.
Yet, even in this map, early signs of erosion were noticeable. Abbott carried a swath of rural counties including Val Verde, Kinney, Terrell, and Hudspeth, while narrowing margins in Zapata and Starr. The overall picture still favored Democrats, but the Republican footholds along the border were no longer confined to sparsely populated ranchland. Abbott’s 40 percent share of the vote set the stage for further GOP gains in the next cycle.
Allred vs. Cruz (2024 General)
The second map tracks the 2024 Senate contest between Colin Allred and Ted Cruz. Here, Democratic strength clearly diminished compared to 2022, but Allred’s performance deserves greater credit, I think. He carried the border precincts by just over ten points, which was a drop of nearly half compared to O’Rourke two years prior, yet he simultaneously outperformed Kamala Harris at the top of the ticket in a more dicey partisan environment.
While Trump was making unprecedented inroads along the border, reshaping the electorate in ways that disadvantaged Democrats, Allred managed to hold his ground and keep margins viable. What stands out is how Cruz consolidated support in Val Verde and Kinney and pushed deeper into Webb and Starr, while Zapata, already trending away from Democrats, turned nearly red. Hidalgo and Cameron still leaned Democratic but by thinner margins than in past elections. Allred’s ability to remain competitive likely rested on his moderate candidate profile and focus on economic pragmatism, which allowed him to blunt Trump-driven Republican gains. Looking ahead to 2026, with Trump no longer on the ballot, Allred has a clearer path to rebuilding the margins O’Rourke reached in 2022, positioning him to capitalize on a friendlier partisan landscape and reconnect with voters who remain persuadable along the border.
Harris vs. Trump (2024 General)
The third map illustrates the most dramatic shift. In the 2024 presidential race, Kamala Harris carried the border precincts by the narrowest of margins, winning just 50.8 percent of the vote to Donald Trump’s 49.2 percent. The Democratic advantage had collapsed from twenty points in 2022 to a near statistical tie two years later.
Trump’s gains were not marginal. He carried Starr, Zapata, and Val Verde outright and achieved competitive parity in Hidalgo and Cameron, where Democrats once enjoyed thirty-point leads! Shockingly, Trump carried Webb County, which (and I could be wrong) might have never been accomplished by a Republican candidate previously (even archiving back to George W. Bush’s gubernatorial re-election in 1998 nor his dominant performance in Texas in 2000 for President). The presidential contest revealed that when Republicans nationalized the race around cost-of-living and cultural issues, their appeal extended even into the nexus of the border counties. For Democrats, sadly, the partisan decline was unmistakable.
The Allred–Trump Split Precincts
The final map may be the most revealing of all. It highlights 197 precincts, accounting for 26 percent of all border precincts, where Allred prevailed in the Senate race but Trump interestingly carried the presidential vote. In these precincts, voters split their tickets, supporting a Democrat for Senate while simultaneously backing Trump for president.
This pattern confirms that border voters are persuadable and not fixed in their partisan identity. Allred’s moderate candidacy and localized economic messaging allowed him to outperform Harris. Trump, however, successfully nationalized the presidential race around economic grievances and cultural politics, pulling voters who were otherwise open to supporting Democrats.
The lesson is clear: these 197 split precincts are the pivot point of statewide politics in Texas. They represent communities that could still be held by Democrats if campaigns speak directly to economic security and family well-being. If Republicans consolidate them, Democrats might lose their last competitive edge in statewide contests.
Border Economies
Understanding why the border is shifting requires moving beyond the electoral maps and into the underlying economic attitudes of Latino voters. Polling conducted in 2025 by DFP and Equis paints a complicated picture. Nationally, 63 percent of Latino voters disapprove of Donald Trump overall, and 65 percent disapprove of his handling of the economy. On the surface, those numbers should insulate Democrats in a heavily Latino region like the border. Yet the reality is more complex.
Latino voters consistently identify cost-of-living, grocery prices, and wages as their top concerns. In the polling, 11 percent cited food costs as their most pressing issue, 7 percent pointed to healthcare, and another 7 percent to wages. These are immediate kitchen table concerns that shape household budgets every week. Republicans have made gains by directly tying those anxieties to Democratic leadership and framing inflation as a failure of national governance.
At the same time, Democrats retain significant trust advantages on healthcare and housing. Latino voters in the polling favor Democrats by 25 points on healthcare and 19 points on housing. These are meaningful gaps. The problem is that they are not displacing the day-to-day pain of grocery bills and wages. The paradox is stark: Latino voters disapprove of Trump and continue to prefer Democrats on key policy areas, but remain open to Republican candidates when their messaging on economic pressures resonates more strongly at the local level.
What It Means for Democrats
The implications of these trends are serious. The border cannot be treated as a guaranteed Democratic turnout bank. The 709,000 votes cast in the region in 2024 show its growing electoral weight, but they also reveal how fragile the Democratic margin has become. A swing of just two or three points in these precincts can shift tens of thousands of net votes statewide. In a close Texas election, that margin can determine the outcome.
The erosion is especially concerning in counties once thought untouchable. Hidalgo and Cameron still delivered Democratic wins in 2024, but the margins were thin enough to raise alarms. Starr, Zapata, and Val Verde are now battlegrounds in their own right. Webb, long considered a Democratic anchor, is moving closer to parity.
For Democrats, the path forward must begin with a recalibration of the message. Immigration and border security dominate the national conversation, but local voters along the Rio Grande Valley remain focused on economic pressures. Campaigns must speak directly to cost of living, wages, and healthcare in culturally resonant ways, with Spanish-language communication and messaging that connects to family security. Defensive efforts in Hidalgo and Cameron are essential to prevent further losses, while targeted persuasion programs must focus on the swing counties where the margins are now razor thin.
Looking Ahead (and Beyond)
The maps of the Texas border precincts tell a story of erosion, persuasion, and shifting identity. Democrats are still winning the border, but they are winning it by less each cycle. The jump in turnout from 2022 to 2024 reflects the structural difference between midterms and presidential elections, not a new wave of Democratic expansion. Republicans have succeeded in mobilizing the expanded electorate to their advantage, making real gains in counties once considered safely blue.
The 197 split precincts where Allred prevailed and Trump did as well are the most important signal. They show a border electorate that is not fixed, but flexible, willing to cross party lines depending on the race. They also show the precise places where Democrats must compete if they want to hold Texas within reach.
Democrats are not yet locked out of the border, but the firewall is no longer secure. It is now contested ground, and unless the party adapts to the economic priorities and cultural realities of border communities, those 753 precincts will cease to provide the margins that once kept them viable statewide. The lesson is simple but urgent. To remain competitive in Texas, Democrats must treat the border as swing territory and fight for it with the same intensity they once reserved for the suburbs of Dallas or the neighborhoods of Houston. The old map is gone. A new one is already here.